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29 April 1955

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


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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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State Dept. review completed

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SUMMARY

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

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4. North Sumatran terrorism may be spreading southward (page 5).

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THE FORMOSA STRAITS
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SOUTHEAST ASIA

3. Thai foreign minister believes Chou sincerely wants peaceful solution of Formosa problem:



Prince Wan, the Thai foreign minister, told Ambassador Cumming in Djakarta on 27 April that he believes Chou En-lai sincerely wants a peaceful solution of the Formosa problem. Senior American officials in Djakarta believe Chou was highly successful in convincing even the most anti-Communist Asian and African leaders of his desire to "relax tensions." They see a danger that Chou may believe that he has succeeded in creating the impression the United States is refusing to negotiate a settlement and that he can now count on at least the private sympathy of these leaders for an attack on the offshore islands.

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Comment: There is no doubt that Chou's proposal to negotiate with the United States made a good impression on the conference. If no negotiations materialize, Peiping

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might believe itself to be in a stronger political position for resuming attacks on the offshore islands.

4. North Sumatran terrorism may be spreading southward:

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[Redacted]

There was a sudden increase of terrorism in the Medan area of Sumatra last week, for which Moslem dissidents, moving southward from the Atjeh area at the northern tip of the islands, are blamed by several sources (see map, p. 6). American officials in Medan and Djakarta believe the objective of the dissidents is not

only to embarrass the Indonesian government, but also to attract the attention of the various Moslem delegates who were attending the Bandung conference.

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Comment: Atjehnese rebels, who have been fighting for autonomy since September 1953, recently were reported to be more than holding their own against government forces. Antigovernment sentiment along Sumatra's east coast is fairly widespread, and the infiltration of any significant number of agitators from neighboring Atjeh might seriously complicate the problems of the thinly spread security forces in the area.

Medan, which has been relatively free of terrorist activity, is located in a rice, rubber and petroleum producing area in which there are large American holdings.

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[Redacted]

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WESTERN INDONESIA

28 April 1955

Atjeh Area

Miles

Kilometers

300

200

100

0

300

200

100

0

10
LESSER SUNDAY ISLANDS
TO
CHRISTMAS I.
(U.K.)

WESTERN INDONESIA

28 April 1955

Legend:

- International boundary
- National capital
- P. Pulau (Island)

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THE FORMOSA STRAITS

Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Formosa Straits Problem

This report is based on information received in Washington up to 1100 hours 28 April 1955.

1. The Peiping radio on April 28 granted that Secretary Dulles' statement was "more flexible" than the 23 April statement of the State Department, but criticized him for expressing "skepticism" as to Peiping's intentions. Peiping noted that instead of talking about the "withdrawal of US armed forces from the Formosa area--a question whose solution is the key to relaxation of tension in the area and the Far East," Secretary Dulles talked about a cease-fire even though "there is no war going on between China and the United States." Peiping quotes his statement that the US would not deal with the rights and claims of the Chinese Nationalists in their absence.

While this statement does not alter Peiping's earlier stand on the "liberation" of Formosa, it is notably free of vituperation and implies the possibility of further exchanges on the terms of possible negotiations. Emphasis on the absence of war between Communist China and the US may be Peiping's effort to reply to the initial US stipulation concerning a cease-fire.

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CHINA - FORMOSA SITUATION
28 April 1955

Nautical miles 0 50 100 150
Statute miles 0 50 100 150

Selected road
Railroad
Proposed railroad

COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND

PRIMARY
SECONDARY
● ▲ OPERATIONAL
● ▲ SERVICEABLE
● ▲ UNKNOWN
● ▲ OTHER

USEABILITY

- MIG-15, MIG-17, TU-4, IL-28
- TU-2, IL-10, LA-9/11, LI-2, etc.
- unknown
- * Fields not considered capable of supporting sustained operations at present.

★ NATIONALIST AIRFIELD

DESIGNATIONS

- PRIMARY: considered most important in area, with prepared runway generally 5000 feet or longer.
- SECONDARY: auxiliary or emergency bases, or fields of lesser importance—runways generally less than 5000 feet.
- OPERATIONAL: consistently used by military & civilian aircraft.
- SERVICEABLE: capable of use by aircraft.
- UNKNOWN: current status undetermined.
- OTHER: under construction, abandoned, or unserviceable.

